The distribution of voters within each party on a liberal-conseivative dimension was as different as that of the candidates. In none of the Democratic primaries, including the south, did more than 8 percent of the voters describe themselves as "very conservative," while in the Republican primaries between 15 and 24 percent of the voters placed themselves in the far right category. Likewise, between 2 and 4 percent of the Republicans described themselves as "very liberal" compared to at least 10 percent in each of the Democratic primaries. The median respondent in each of the Republican primaries was "somewhat conseivative." In the Democratic primaries, the median respondent was either "moderate" or "somewhat liberal." It is safe to locate the median voter in the Democratic primaries a bit to the left of center and the median voter in Republican primaries as quite a bit to the right of center, though probably not far right. In the electorate as a whole the median voter lies near the center of the ideological spectrum.
[ Insert Table 1 here ]
Another noteworthy feature of Table 1 is that the ideological distribution within the parties seems to vary by state. On the Democratic side, the South especially, and Illinois to a lesser extent, had fewer liberal voters. Only one third of the Southern Democrats identified themselves or liberal or very liberal, for instance, as opposed to 49% of New Hampshire Democrats and 48% of New York Democrats. In no state, however, did a majority of Democrats identify themselves as liberals. Our sample of Republican states is smaller, but there were some significant differences -Illinois Republicans were considerably less conservative than Republicans in Iowa. Interestingly, Southern
Republican voters in 1988 were not distinctively more conservative than those in Iowa and New Hampshire as were their Democratic counterparts. In general, the ideological configuration was more complex for Democratic than Republican candidates. While Democratic candidates in 1988 had to adapt to very different distributions of opinion as they progressed through the sequence of primaries, Republican candidates did not need to contend with as much ideological heterogeneity.
Voting in the 1988 primaries consistently followed ideological lines. The evidence relating ideological self-placement to primary voting is presented in Tables 2a and 2b . In every state except ffiinois Dukakis won a plurality of ti ' le 11somewhat liberal11 vote. Gephardt and Gore each did better among "moderate" and "somewhat conservative" voters (by as much as twenty points) than among liberal voters. Jackson and Simon support was generally strongest among "very liberal" voters. On the Republican side, Kemp and Robertson support grew with the conservatism of the voter: it was negligible among liberal voters, stronger among moderates, stronger still among moderate conservatives, and often a plurality among very conservative voters. For Dole the pattern was reversed. Dole, despite his conservative voting record in the Senate and his loyal service as majority leader, could muster only modest support among conservatives. He fared well among moderates, but it turned out there weren't enough moderates in the Republican primaries to defeat Bush who, in every state but Iowa, swept the "somewhat conservative" category.
[ Insert Tables 2a and 2b here ]
In two-candidate races, the median is the most advantageous location for a candidate.3 If voters decide solely on the basis of ideology, the median defeats any other position. However, the situation is much more complicated in multi-candidate elections since a candidate adopting the position of the median voter can be "squeezed" out by candidates on either side. Even though the median can be a dangerous spot in a multicandidate election, what we show in subsequent sections is that a variety of other factors-region, race, religion-worked to the advantage of the median candidates in 1988 by weakening their opponents to the right and left. It should be said, however, that there were a few notable exceptions to the patterns described above.
First, Dukakis and Simon in lliinois received a higher percentage of votes from moderates and moderate conservatives than from liberals. The apparent reason for this reversal of the expected relationship is that Jackson's presence as a viable candidate on the left forced moderate and conservative Democrats to coalesce around any candidate to the right of Jackson, no matter how objectionable. Second, in a number of states (Iowa, the south, lliinois) Bush's overall strength was unrelated to ideological identification. Of course, Bush's support relative to Dole did vary by the voter's position so it cannot be said that ideology was unimportant in the Republican race.
In summary, although the unlying ideological orientation of the two parties differed measurably, both the Democratic and Republican contests featured candidates on the left, middle and right of their respective constituencies. The "middle" for Democrats was considerably to the left of that for Republicans, but in both parties there was a considerable middle and it was from here that the victorious candidates emerged. There was nothing inevitable, however, about the primaries producing candidates near each party's median, as in both parties there were strong candidates on either flank. We must tum to a variety of nonideological factors to explain the eventual success of the centrist candidates.
3. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; New York: Harper and Row, 1957, Chapter 8. 4. Ibid, pp.47-9 .
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
Presidential primaries are a part of a complex coalition building process. In the Democratic primaries, one notices a variety of cleavages in the primary electorate.
We discuss support for Jackson in more detail below, but, in broad outline, Jackson supporters can be divided into two groups: blacks (and other nonwhites) and very liberal, well-educated whites. Ltl. the Repub!ica.11 primaries, the electorate is more homogeneous and the demographic cleavages much less apparent. On Super Tuesday, Dole drew greater support among white--<:ollar college educated voters than Bush, but the opposite was the case in Iowa. There was a small but persistent pro-Dole bias in the female in the Republican primaries Bush did relatively well among the small number of union members voting in the Republican primaries, but there was little indication in the primary data of how Bush would fare among the blue--<:ollar whites in November.
ISSUES AND CANDIDATE SUPPORT
The LA Times also asked a series of questions on specific issues that allow us to identify more precisely the policy matters of importance in the 1988 primaries. These items cover a broad range of issues-economic, social and foreign policy. Each item is in the form of a statement to which respondents can indicate their agreement. Failure to agree can indicate either no opinion or disagreement so these items must be interpreted with caution. In Regionalism may have also mattered in a second sense--namely that "home" victories did not have much impact on other states. The successes of Dole, Gephardt and Simon in Iowa did not carry over into New Hampshire. Gore was unable to tum a strong (and better than expected) showing in the South into any victories after March 8. Even in the case of Dukakis, it was not New
Hampshire, but rather Florida, Texas and New York that seemed to be more crucial to his eventual success. Candidates are nonnally expected to do better on their home turf, so it is not surprising that the victories of Dole and Gephardt in Iowa, Dukakis in New Hampshire, and Gore on Super Tuesday did not generate much momentum. But, by dampening the informational value and muddling the significance of a victory, regionalism slowed the winnowing process and delayed the emergence of a single nominee.
What evidence is there of regionalism? We present two kinds. The fi rst comes from a question that the LA Times repeated in every primary asking voters to identify the reasons for why they supported the candidate that they did (see Table 4 ). In the Iowa Republican caucus, voters who mentioned the experience of their candidate were more or less evenly divided between Bush and Dole (46 percent for Dole, 42 percent for Bush). Those who referred to leadershlp or to the prospect of the candidate getting the job done preferred Dole to Bush by about a two-to-one margin. But among the 15 percent who mentioned that the candidate was "from the midwest and understands our problems," Dole had the edge on Bush 95 percent to 3 percent Of course, since Bush had no significant link by either birth or residency to the mid west, one wouldn't expect Bush voters to cite regional connections. Nonetheless, 38 percent of Dole voters did cite thls as a reason for their vote.
Additionally, 18 percent of the voters spoke of their preferred candidate's ability to "care about people like me," and they preferred Dole to Bush by almost a five to one margin.
[ Insert Table 4 here ]
A similar story can be told about the Democratic primary in Iowa. Gephardt, who wolked very hard to identify hlmself with regional issues and concerns, was the leading candidate in only two categories: empathy ("seems to care about people like us") and being from the midwest. By comparison, Dukakis was the first choice of those who mentioned leadershlp and efficiency, and
Simon was first among those who valued trust and experience (although he was second to Gephardt among those who gave being from midwest as a reason). Altogether, as from New England and understood their problems. Dukakis was also preferred by the 27 percent who claimed that they voted the way that they did because the candidate "seems to care about people like me."
Given the intent of Super Tuesday, it is not surprising to fi.. 1 1d t.. 11.at regionalism was also mentioned by 8 percent of Democratic voters and 18 percent of those who voted for Gore on March 8, and that Gore was second only to Jackson among the 21 percent who mentioned empathy with the region as a reason for voting they way that they did. Corroborating our new found law about multiple homes, Jackson got relatively small advantages in the south and Illinois for hls regional connections to those areas. Illinois was the last significant primary in whlch regionalism was evident according to thls measure, benefitting Simon and, belatedly, Dole.
A second, more sophlsticated test of the same phenomenon comes from the equation in Table A2 in the appendix. Here we have combined the data from all of the exit polls in order to obtain an estimate of the effects of regional affiliation on primary voting. Being from the same region as a candidate is estimated to increase one's probability of voting for that candidate by between 9 and 13 percent (depending upon one's inclination to support the candidate for other reasons). The effect is statistically significant (p < 0.01) and does not reflect the infl uence of other factors, such as race, class or ideology, that are controlled for in the equation.
If the data suggest that regionalism was a sometimes decisive factor in 1988, the question is, "Why?" The first explanation is that Reagan's economic policies had different effects on different sectors of the economy and regions of the country and this was reflected in political behavior.
Elsewhere, one of us has argued that Reagan's highly popular presidency was due less to his tefl on personality than to robust economic conditions. 5 However, not all parts of the economy have prospered during this period. Farmers in the midwest, residents in oil producing regions such as the southwest, and workers in rustbelt industries threatened by foreign competition have not shared fully in the recovery of the past five years, and this caused discontent in some areas that Reagan carried in the last election.
One possibility, therefore, is that varying sectoral economic conditions fueled regionalism in 1988. Midwestern voters were anxious about their fann economy and threats to manufacturing from overseas competition. Among Republican voters in the Iowa primary, fann policy was third in issue salience (mentioned by one fi fth of the voters), and the majority of those who thought that it was important (58 percent) preferred Dole to all the other candidates and over Bush, in particular, by a six to one margin. Farm policy was among the top three issues for the Iowa Democrats, and those for whom fann policy was salient preferred Gephardt to any other candidate by more than three to one. Foreign trade was also considered an important issue by nearly a fifth of the Democrats, and they too favored Gephardt over the others by at least two to one.
However, voters in the east and south did not exhibit the same sectoral economic concerns that preoccupied voters in the midwest. Fann issues were barely discussed outside the midwest and foreign trade was mentioned by only 11 percent of the Democrats and by 14 percent and 8 percent of the Republicans in New Hampshire and the south respectively. In the latter case, Dole's advantage on these issues in Iowa went over to Bush by New Hampshire and Supeffuesday, and in Gephardt's case, Gore took the voters with trade concerns in the South. In other words, even when the foreign trade and fonn issues remained salient, the midwestern candidate did not always benefi t
Aside from the economic basis of regionalism, another reason it may have played so prominent a role in 1988 has to do with the incentives arising from conventional momentum theory.
If it is true that early victories are the key and that the race is over before it gets to states like Indiana, Ohio and California, then it is natural for those with a home base in the early primary states to think that they might have a leg up on the opposition. Midwestern candidates had a name recognition advantage in Iowa that helped distinguish them from the large field of relatively unknown candidates. On the Democratic side, the candidates with the highest name recognition in Iowa were the two who had run for the nomination in 1984 (Hart 93% and Jackson 92% own who understood and spoke eloquently about the black community's struggle with drugs, crime and poverty.
The upscale profile of Jackson's white supporters was widely noted by the press. A perusal of the logit estimates in the appendix shows that the odds of voting for Jackson versus Dukakis were positively and signifi cantly enhanced by being college educated in nearly all of the states the Times polled in. A corollary to this is that Jackson ran well in areas with large numbers of college students.
Jackson also tended to do better among white-<:ollar than blue-<:ollar whites. For instance, the estimates in the appendix show Gephardt in Iowa and Gore in the south did better than Jackson with blue-collar whites. Even after Gephardt and Gore dropped out, Jackson was unable to gain any particular advantage over Dukakis among blue-<:ollar white voters (see the Pennsylvania and California equations). Needless to say, our data indicate clearly that the core of Jackson's support was black. Jackson received over 90 percent of the black vote in every state polled by the LA Times, and the coefficients in the Jackson equation reflect this dramatically.
Why did Jackson get the upscale white-<:ollar white rather than the blue-<:ollar white
Democratic vote? The answer lies in the left wing appeal of the Jackson campaign. In Table 2 , which shows the distribution of Democratic vote by self-identifi ed ideological placement, we saw earlier that Jackson was the fi rst choice of the very liberal voters in every state polled except New
Hampshire and Pennsylvania. Moreover, the coefficients on the ideology variables in the various equations in the appendix indicate that, controlling for demographic factors, the odds of voting for Jackson increased as one went from being a conservative to a moderate to a liberal. Jackson attracted left-wing votes and the white left in the Democratic party tends to be college-educated, white-<:ollar-not working class.
Another piece of evidence on this point can be found in Table 3 , which displays at the bottom the proportion of white white-<:ollar Democrats, white blue-<:ollar Democrats, Hispanic It is not surprising therefore that well-educated upper class white Democrats were attracted to Jackson's candidacy. When asked to name the qualities that led them to vote the way they did on Super Tuesday, the leading answer for Jackson whites was Jackson's "vision" or "convictions" (67 percent). By comparison, blacks were most likely to mention empathy ( 49 percent}--that he "understood their problems." Asked to name the issues that were most important to their decisions, white Jackson supporters were more likely than black Jackson supporters to mention defense and morality in government while Jackson blacks were more likely to say social security. There are several pieces of evidence on this point in the LA Times data. In both the New York and Pennsylvania primaries, voters were asked in the exit poll to explain their choices. In New York, 14 percent said that they were voting primarily against another candidate and 11 percent indicated that they were casting their ballots in a manner that did not waste their votes.
Seventy-seven percent of the former and 64 percent of the latter voted for Dukakis over Jackson and Gore. By comparison, Dukakis only received 36 percent of the vote from those who said they were willing to "express their feelings" and 42 percent from those who were voting for "the best man for the job." Also in New York, 54 percent of those sampled agreed with the statement that casting a ballot for Gore was a wasted vote. Of these, not too suiprisingly, Dukakis won 62 percent of the votes and Gore only 5 percent. Gore received his strongest support among conservatives, but moderates voted overwhelmingly for Dukakis.
The same pattern was repeated in Pennsylvania. Overall, 12 percent of those voting said that their main motivation was to vote against the other (of whom 83 percent voted for Dukakis) and another 12 percent said that they were motivated by not wanting to waste their votes (of whom 76 percent voted for Dukakis). As in New York, a little over half (51 percent) thought that voting for Gore was equivalent to throwing away their vote and, of these, three quarters voted for Dukakis.
Again, by comparison, Dukakis got 62 percent of the vote from those who voted to express their feelings and 64 percent of those who thought that their candidate was the best man for the job. Even in California, long after the race was decided, 10 percent of the voters indicated that they were motivated by an interest in not wasting their votes.
The two major categories of voters whose support swung to Dukakis in New York and Pennsylvania were non-liberals and Jews. In Iowa and New Hampshire, Dukakis had drawn fairly evenly from the "somewhat conservative", "somewhat liberal" and "moderate" voters, but his share of them almost doubled in New York and Pennsylvania, as is evident in Table 2a . In Pennsylvania, 
CONCLUSION: THE MYTH OF MOMENTUM?
WPit.l ier momentu . .. . T..? The conventional wisdom about presidential primaries is that victories in the early caucuses and primaries give a candidate a burst of media attention which, in tum, generates campaign contributions and additional exposure. A bandwagon is begun which can propel a previously unknown candidate-such as George McGovern or Jimmy Carter-to the nomination.
Nineteen eighty-eight hardly fits this pattern. Robert Dole and Richard Gephardt won the Iowa caucuses handily, but it was the first, last, and only hurrah for their campaigns. Michael Dukakis, not too surprisingly, won neighboring New Hampshire, only to be beaten by Albert Gore (who sat out Iowa and New Hampshire) or Jesse Jackson in every southern state except Florida and Texas.
One might attribute Dukakis's victories in those two states to momentum, but then how can one explain Jackson, Dukak:is, and Gore all losing to Paul Simon in Illinois?
7. "The Airis Bitter to Buoyant as Voting Nears," Bernard Weintraub, New York Times, April 19, 1988.
We think an alternative explanation better accounts for the course of the 1988 primary campaign than conventional momentum theories and, possibly, for primaries in other years as well.
The explanation centers on strategic voting. In two-candidate races, voters face a relatively simple decision: is one candidate preferable to the other? In multi-candidate races (as are most presidential primaries), the decision problem is considerably more complicated. Consider, for example, the situation in the 1988 New York Democratic primary. The field had, for all practical purposes, been reduced to Dukakis, Jackson, and Gore. However, most polls showed Jackson running close to Dukakis with Gore far behind. A Jackson victory appeared to be a real possibility. Many conservative and Jewish voters preferred Gore to Dukakis to Jackson. Their dilemma was obvious:
voting for their most preferred candidate (Gore) might lead to the unthinkable, a Jackson victory. By and large, conservative voters abandoned Gore and swelled Dukakis's margin of victory.
The strategic considerations described above are not unique to the New York primary and, in our view, are pervasive in multi-candidate primaries. In general, it is an equilibrium strategy in a three candidate race fo r a voter to support the candidate he or she prefers among the two candidates who are most preferred by the remaining voters. That is, one counts the number of other voters who most prefer a particular candidate and eliminate from consideration the candidate preferred by the least number of voters. In New York, this was clearly Gore.
How can such strategic considerations account for the course of the 1988 presidential primary campaign? In our view, the effect of earlier primaries is not to create a bandwagon, but to help voters gauge the preferences of other voters. If two states are similar and one holds their primary before the other, voters in the second primary can interpret the outcome of the first primary as a sort of " straw poll" of voters in their own state to determine which candidates are likely to be in contention for a first place finish. 
